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Are there good grounds for thinking that the moral values of action are to be derived from 
those of character? This "virtue ethical" claim is sometimes thought of as a kind of 
normative ethical theory; sometimes as form of opposition to any such theory. However, 
the best case to be made for it supports neither of these claims. Rather, it leads us to a 
distinctive view in moral epistemology: the view that my warrant for a particular moral 
judgement derives from my warrant for believing that I am a good moral judge. This view 
seems to confront a regress-problem. For the belief that I am a good moral judge is itself a 
particular moral judgement. So it seems that, on this view, I need to derive my warrant for 
believing that I am a good moral judge from my warrant for believing that I am a good 
judge of moral judges; and so on.  I show how this worry can be met, and trace the 
implications of the resulting view for warranted moral judgement. 
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I: INTRODUCTION 
One claim often made distinctive of “virtue ethics” is this: 
(V) The moral values of action are to be derived from those of character. 
This can be read different ways, since saying that one value is “to be derived” from 
another can mean different things. On a first reading, (V) asserts a relationship of 
constitution between the value-tokens in question: what makes a given action have the 
value it has is the value of a related state of character. On a second, by contrast, it claims a 
relationship of justificational warrant between judgements attributing those values. These 
two relationships — call them “constitutive justification” and “warrant for judgement”, 
respectively — are clearly distinct: I am not always warranted in judging truly, and am 
sometimes warranted in judging falsely, so what makes something the correct thing to 
think and what warrants me in thinking what I am warranted in thinking must be different.  
 This essay examines whether there is a plausible case for (V), and its relation to 
ethical theory. (V) is often presented as a distinctive kind of normative ethical theory, to 
be contrasted with the consequentialist and deontological alternatives. Instead of 
assessing the rightness of actions in terms of their consequences or the act-types to which 
they belong, a “virtue theory” assesses them in terms of the states of character from which 
they issue.1 However, incompatibly with this, the emphasis on the priority of character- 
over act-assessment is sometimes associated with a repudiation of ethical theory 
altogether.2 Is either of these views plausible? 
 
1  See e.g. Michael Slote, “Virtue Ethics,” in Marcia W. Baron, Philip Pettit, and Michael Slote, Three 
Methods of Ethics (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997); Rosalind Hursthouse, “Normative Virtue Ethics,” in Roger 
Crisp (ed.), How Should One Live? (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996). 
2  For works which suggest this latter position to varying degrees, see Bernard Williams, Ethics and the 
Limits of Philosophy (London: Collins, 1985), Ch.10; Annette Baier, Postures of the Mind (Minneapolis: 
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 I begin with the second. Is there a tenable position linking (V) to the rejection of 
ethical theory? We need to identify the target of the attack to assess its success. I take it 
that its essential features are captured by the following: 
An ethical theory is a morally substantive set of propositions such that: 
(a) It is claimed that those moral judgements that follow from it are correct. 
(b) It is highly systematic, relative to the judgements for which it supplies a 
theory. 
(c) It is highly unified, relative to the judgements for which it supplies a theory. 
This makes the issue of whether a set of propositions constitutes an ethical theory a matter 
of degree. A structure is systematic, I shall assume, to the extent that its members are 
linked by inferential chains. A and B are linked by an inferential chain when they are the 
first and last members of a sequence each member of which bears a direct inferential 
relationship to the previous one – either supporting or being supported by it. A structure is 
unified to the extent that its members have common inferential sources.  
 The inferential relationships claimed by an ethical theory are relationships of 
constitutive justification. But a common rationale for seeking such a theory concerns 
warrant for judgement. If we can be warranted in advocating an ethical theory, we are 
warranted in making the judgements that follow from it; so it can seem promising to look 
to an ethical theory for a source of warrant for contentious moral judgements. This can 
even seem the only such source — without a warrant for advocating such a theory, the 
aim of warranting many contested judgements must be abandoned, since they will be no 
better supported than their contraries. The virtue-ethical attack on ethical theory, as I shall 
characterize it, maintains that this idea rests on a confusion, and, in particular, on a 
misguided picture of the role of rules in the justification of moral judgement.  
                                                                                                                                                 
University of Minnesota Press, 1985), pp. 209–20, 234-6; Edmund L. Pincoffs, Quandaries and Virtues: 
Against Reductivism in Ethics  (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1986); and, especially, John 
McDowell, “Virtue and Reason,” Monist 63 (1979), Sect.4. 
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 My first conclusion is the rejection of this claim. In any sense in which (V) is 
plausible, it leaves plenty of scope for theorizing in ethics. But my second is that it does 
not make sense to think of such an activity as furnishing a “virtue theory”. In doing so, I 
oppose the other line concerning ethical theory taken by proponents of (V). 
 These conclusions are entirely negative. But there is a more positive side to the essay. 
For despite these conclusions, a strong case can be made for (V) itself, at least on one 
interpretation — an interpretation, moreover, on which it supplies a plausible framework 
for moral epistemology. 
 
II: CHARACTER, RULES, AND THEORY 
Just how are the values of actions to be derived from those of character, as proposed by 
(V)? In particular, from whose character are we to derive them? 
 (V) has no plausibility when read as the claim that the moral value of an action is to 
be derived from that of the character of the agent performing it — for actions can be 
performed “out of character”. To make (V) credible, it must be interpreted along these 
lines:  
(V1) The rightness of an action in a given set of circumstances is to be derived from 
its being one that a fully informed and virtuous agent would perform in those 
circumstances (if acting in character).  
 Now this may seem to run into a familiar kind of problem: one common to all 
attempts to explain norms governing actual agents in terms of descriptions of ideal ones.3 
For surely the appropriate action for me, a less than fully virtuous agent, differs in various 
 
3  The now-standard response to this problem is to talk of the advice that ideal agents would give actual 
ones: see e.g. Michael Smith, The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), pp.150–51ff. My own 
response in the text amounts to a version of this. For the difficulties with offering this kind of claim as an 
analysis of rightness see Simon Blackburn, Ruling Passions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), pp.104-19. 
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ways from what a perfectly virtuous agent would do. I ought to make amends to people 
I’ve let down. I ought sometimes to do things to help myself become more virtuous. And 
my actions ought to take account of my own moral imperfection: given my own limited 
moral courage, for example, it might be irresponsible to take on a role in which others 
importantly rely on me to stand up to pressure. But a perfectly virtuous agent would never 
need to do these things. 
 These would be serious problems if (V1) referred us, in talking of the action “that a 
virtuous agent would perform”, to an agent who was exceptionlessly virtuous throughout 
his life. But (V1) should not be read that way. Think instead of an agent with my past, and 
who knows he will revert to my psychological make-up once his decision is taken. These, 
after all, are my circumstances: the circumstances of my past and future moral 
imperfection. But now the examples just given cease to be problematic: the rightness-
claims they contain are all endorsed by (V1). The last of them does raise a further point. 
Should I commit myself to a role demanding greater moral courage than I think I possess? 
Declining is the right thing for me to do. However, there also remains a sense in which the 
morally courageous action is the right thing to do — it’s just that I am not the right person 
to do it. (V1) usefully spans both answers. The first corresponds to the action of a 
virtuous agent who knows he will revert to my psychological make-up; the second, one 
who knows he will not. 
 (V1) is not simply refuted by a familiar line of objection. But how can it be supported, 
and what is its relation to the attack on ethical theorizing? One influential argument 
answers these questions by attacking a picture of the role of rules in ethical justification.4  
 
4  For the argument that follows, compare John McDowell, “Virtue and Reason,” Monist 63 (1979), Sect.4; 
also his “Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following,” in Stephen H. Holtzman and Christopher M. Leich (eds), 
Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule  (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981). The problem discussed here 
should be distinguished from the “problem of rule-following” (much discussed in connection with 
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 On this picture, justification presupposes the existence of rules. If the application of a 
moral concept C to a given object is to be justified, it must instantiate a rule for applying 
C, and if I am to be justified in applying C to that object, I must be following that rule. 
For only the existence of a rule governing a practice prevents it from being arbitrary, and 
the arbitrariness of a practice precludes any talk of justification in relation to it. 
 Now there is a way of taking this that makes it incontrovertible. That there is a right 
way and a wrong way of applying a given concept is just equivalent to the existence of a 
rule ruling in some ways and ruling out others. The principal claim here concerns 
constitutive justification: 
(a) What makes it right to apply concept C to this object is its instantiating the rule 
for the application of C. 
And from this, a claim concerning warrant for judgement seems to follow. Provided I 
possess the concept of following a rule, claim (a) tells me that I will have a warrant for 
believing that I am right to apply C to this object whenever I have a warrant for believing 
that there is a rule for the application of C that I would be following if I did so.5 If so, 
then, at least for those who do have that concept, we also have: 
(b) What warrants me in judging that C applies to this object is my warrant for 
judging that I am following the rule for the application of C. 
 However, it can be tempting to construe (a) and (b) in a way which makes them far 
from incontrovertible. This happens when it is assumed that the rule they mention must be 
independently articulable — articulable independently, that is to say, of the rule: 
(R) Identify instances falling under the concept C. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Wittgenstein) concerning what kind of entity a rule can be if it is both to determine its applications, and be 
accessible to us. 
5   I could be warranted in thinking I was applying a concept correctly without being warranted in believing 
anything about rule-following, if I lacked the concepts necessary for forming the latter belief. 
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This assumption can tempt people to think that if the practice of applying C is to be non-
arbitrary, there must be some further rule governing it, and that I am warranted in judging 
that I am rightly applying C only if I am warranted in thinking that I am guided by such a 
rule. And according to “virtue-ethical” opponents of ethical theory, it is this thought that 
encourages the view that warranting ethical judgements about contentious cases requires a 
theory. In order to warrant my judgement about the application of C in a contested case, I 
must produce and justify a rule supporting my practice; and such rules, and their 
justifications, are supplied by ethical theories. 
 The complaint is that this further reading of (a) and (b) is not only unsupported by the 
thoughts about arbitrariness; it looks highly dubious. If the application of a concept is not 
to be arbitrary, there must be right and wrong ways of applying it, so there must be a rule 
ruling in right and ruling out wrong ways of applying it. But all this requires is that, if 
there are to be right and wrong ways of applying C, then (R) must itself constitute a 
genuine rule, rather than ruling out nothing. It does not require a further, independently 
articulable rule for when one counts as following (R). After all, a general requirement of 
this kind would apply to the concepts employed in any further rule, producing either 
circularity or a vicious regress — vicious, because it would yield an infinite and therefore 
unfulfillable chain of relationships of dependence. 
 There must, therefore, be some concepts for which there are no independently 
articulable rules; and if so, we have been given no argument for thinking that moral 
concepts must be governed by such rules. From this conclusion, which concerns 
constitutive justification, a conclusion concerning warrant for judgement follows, as 
before. If no independently articulable rule governs the application of a concept, my being 
warranted in applying it as I do can hardly depend on my being warranted in judging that 
there is such a rule. 
 The upshot of this argument is that when I face a conflict between moral reasons — 
pro tanto reasons to assign incompatible moral values to an action — I should not look to 
a theory to provide me with a further, fully determinative rule for resolving the conflict, 
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by assigning relative strengths to those reasons. At the very least, the onus lies with a 
proponent of such fully determinative rules to produce a plausible example, once the 
thought that they must exist has been undermined. What I need instead, according to this 
line of argument, is moral sensitivity, good moral judgement: an appreciation of the true 
moral value of things. Having this does involve following a rule — but only the rule: 
Give every moral reason its due moral importance. 
This is what I must do in order to make the right judgement when my moral reasons 
conflict; but we have been given no case for believing that that requires me to be 
following some further rule. 
 How, on this view, can I be warranted in evaluating an action as I do? This seems to 
require a warrant for thinking that, when I make my evaluation, I am exercising good 
moral judgement. The difficulties with this view will be our next concern. But first, notice 
how it delivers a version of (V1). 
 It does so provided our usage of virtue-terms makes moral discernment a necessary 
condition of virtue. This is by no means the only usage: undiscriminating action is 
commonly described as virtuous but misguided — as misplaced kindness, say, or 
excessive loyalty. But (V1) cannot be using virtue-terms that way; for clearly, on that 
usage virtuous and fully informed action need not be right. (V1) must be presupposing a 
different usage, according to which you only count as possessing a moral virtue to the 
extent that your attitude towards the situations it covers is properly discriminate: if your 
devotion to a friend or cause is excessive, then it displays not the virtue of loyalty but the 
vice of partisanship. This usage need not make good judgement necessary for virtue: it 
can allow that, if my beliefs about a situation are reasonable but incorrect, that 
compromises my judgement but not my virtue.6 Virtue always involves discernment, on 
 
6  Nor is it sufficient. A courageous person must be able to appreciate what is the right thing for an agent to 
do in situations of danger or discomfort. But this is not sufficient for courage. She must be able to see this 
when she is in such situations, and must not only see what is the right thing to do but must do it as well. 
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this usage, but discernment must be supplemented with full information to produce good 
judgement. That is, on the usage of virtue-terms (V1) presupposes, the actions a good 
moral judge would think right are those a fully informed and virtuous agent would 
perform (if acting in character). Presumably, not everyone is warranted in believing this. 
But for those of us who are, we have a warrant for believing that a fully informed and 
virtuous agent would perform an action whenever we have a warrant for believing that a 
good moral judge would think it right. The earlier argument concluded that what warrants 
me in judging that a given action is right is my warrant for thinking that I am exercising 
good moral judgement in so judging. So, putting these claims together, we arrive at:  
 (V2) What warrants me in judging that this action in these circumstances is right is 
my warrant for judging that a fully informed and virtuous agent would perform this 
action in these circumstances.  
And this is claim (V1), interpreted as concerning warrant for judgement. 
 This should not, however, lead us to take (V1) seriously when taken as a claim about 
constitutive justification. Indeed, if (V1) presupposes a usage according to which an 
action only qualifies as expressing a virtue to the extent that it is not morally 
objectionable, it is hard to see how what makes an action right could be its expression of a 
virtue.7 On the contrary, this usage seems to be taking an action’s rightness to be 
constitutively prior to its virtue-expression.   
 Accordingly, (V2) will be our focus in what follows. Can moral epistemology be 
satisfactorily pursued along these virtue-ethical lines? Let us investigate. 
 
 
7  I say this is hard to see; but I think there is at least one case in which we can find such support. See my 
“Moral Character and the Iteration Problem,” Utilitas 7 (1995). 
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III:  WARRANTING VIRTUE-CLAIMS 
 How can I be warranted in thinking a given action has moral value M? On the virtue-
ethical view on offer, what warrants me in thinking this is my warrant for thinking that 
good moral judges would think this. 
 Now one way of taking this makes it easily rejectable, and another makes it trivial. 
The first takes it as a claim concerning what it is to be warranted in making a moral 
judgement — what warrant for such a judgement consists in. But as an account of this 
kind, what has been offered is clearly hopeless. It would be viciously circular, in 
purporting to explain the constitution of warrant for thoughts with a moral content by 
appealing, in the explanans, to the notion of warrant for thoughts with a certain specific 
sort of moral content, concerning good moral judges. A second way of taking the claim is 
as the modest biconditional: 
I am warranted in thinking that this action is M if and only if I am warranted in 
thinking that good moral judges would think that this action is M 
But this is modest enough to be trivial. Good moral judges are simply those who make 
non-accidentally correct moral assessments. So this biconditional simply reduces to the 
claim: I am warranted in thinking that this action is M if and only if I am warranted in 
thinking that people who make non-accidentally correct moral assessments would think 
that this action is M.   
 But the virtue-ethicist’s claim should be read in neither of these ways. It is not a meta-
epistemological claim concerning the constitution of moral warrant, but a substantive 
position in moral epistemology, concerning the conditions under which particular moral 
judgements are in fact warranted.8 And as a substantive position of this kind, it goes 
beyond the trivial biconditional to make a claim of epistemological priority. When I am 
warranted in judging that this action is M, what warrants me in that judgement is my 
warrant for judging that good moral judges would think this. It is to my warrant for the 
 
8  Still less is it a kind of ideal observer theory of the constitution or extension of moral value itself. 
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claim concerning good moral judges that I must look to supply a warrant for my own 
moral views. “The virtue-ethicist’s view”, in what follows, will refer to this claim of 
epistemological priority, as drawn from the rule-following argument. 
  The virtue-ethicist’s view makes the basic task for moral epistemology the warranting 
of judgements about what good moral judges would think. But how can I acquire a 
warrant for these judgements? It seems I must do three things: 
(a) Produce an account of the characteristics distinctive of good moral judges. 
(b) Justify that account. 
(c) Justify the claim that judges with those characteristics would make the 
judgement in question. 
And now we seem to have a dilemma. Either the account at (a) amounts to a fully 
determinative rule of the form: 
All and only those people possessing characteristics XYZ are good moral judges; 
or it gives us a prima facie rule of the form: 
X, Y, and Z provide presumptive reasons to think that someone is a good moral 
judge. 
But fully determinative rules are precisely what the virtue-ethicist is questioning. Non-
arbitrary standards for good moral judges do not presuppose a fully determinative rule, 
articulable independently of the notion of a good moral judge. This does not prove that 
there is no such rule, but it casts the onus on their proponents to produce a plausible 
candidate, and it is hard to be optimistic about the prospects of producing one that is both 
fully specific and exception-proof. 
 If so, account (a) can supply at most a set of prima facie rules for identifying good 
moral judges. But if it supplies only prima facie rules, it cannot on its own license 
conclusions concerning who is a good moral judge. In order to apply those rules correctly, 
I need good moral judgement. And that seems to produce a vicious regress. Account (a) 
was being sought to enable me to warrant my judgements concerning good moral judges. 
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But it turns out that I can only apply the account correctly if I myself am a good moral 
judge (of good moral judges). So I can only be warranted in thinking that I am drawing 
the right conclusions if I am warranted in thinking that I am a good moral judge. But what 
warrants me in thinking that? This was the question we wanted an answer to in the first 
place.   
 To see our way out of this dilemma, we should begin by trying to sketch an account of 
good moral judges. 
 
IV:  GOOD MORAL JUDGES 
What are the distinguishing characteristics of a good moral judge? We can put the same 
question by asking about the characteristics of good moral judgement — provided we are 
clear that “judgement” here refers to the faculty of judging, or the exercise of that faculty 
on particular occasions, rather than the thing judged. (What I judge can happen to be 
correct even if I am a bad judge.)  
 Rather than attempting a fully argued answer, I shall offer a list of five features that at 
least provide a starting-point for an account of good moral judgement, and an explanation 
of the sources of support for it. The aim is simply to show the reasonableness of thinking 
that a proper account could be given. But we shall then see how this allows us to solve 
our dilemma. 
 The first feature is this: basing one’s judgement on full attention to all and only the 
morally relevant features of the object judged. If, in thinking about a situation, you have 
simply overlooked an issue of integrity, say, or gratitude that it involves, then that is a 
ground for faulting your judgement.9 The same applies if you have registered these issues, 
but only glancingly; or if you are influenced by a morally irrelevant issue, such as the 
appearances of the people involved. The relevance of this first characteristic to good 
 
9  I.e. (as before), fault your judging, not what you judge. 
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moral judgement is obvious. To the extent that one is warranted in thinking a feature of an 
object morally relevant, one is warranted in faulting the judgement of someone who fails 
fully to attend to it, and to the extent that one is warranted in thinking a feature morally 
irrelevant, one is warranted in faulting the judgement of someone who gives it moral 
weight. What is less obvious is what to say about the epistemology of judgements 
concerning moral relevance: we shall need to return to that later.  
 Full attention to all and only morally relevant features does not suffice for good moral 
judgement, however. One must think about them in the right way, and assign them the 
right relative importance, in reaching a conclusion about the object of assessment. What 
are the characteristics of an agent who is also doing this? Clearly, she must be free of 
inferential error or inconsistency — this is a second feature of good moral judges. For a 
third and fourth, it seems we should add sympathy and impartiality. That someone’s 
interests are affected by a proposed course of action is a morally relevant feature of it; if I 
fully attend to this, but lack sympathy, that suffices to vitiate my judgement about the 
action. And partiality to myself or those I love can readily distort my judgement about 
what is right, even if it is flawless in the other respects. 
 A fifth feature can be added to our list, provided it is clear that it is not a constituent 
of good moral judgement, but only an indicator of it: this is a person’s relevant moral 
experience. My failure to appreciate the right way of taking the various morally relevant 
features of a situation into account may arise through my lack of experience of situations 
of this kind. This is not to say that lack of experience always prevents a person from 
exercising good judgement, nor that the judgement of a more experienced person cannot 
be worse. The claim, rather, is this: if two people, neither of whom can be faulted in the 
first four respects, differ in their judgement about the moral character of an object, and the 
difference is to be explained by the lack of experience of one of the parties to the 
disagreement, then that is a good reason for preferring the judgement of the more 
experienced person.  
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 This gives us a list of five characteristics of good moral judgement: why accept it? 
There are two good reasons. The first is our convergence on these factors when each of us 
identifies the sources of his own acknowledged failures of moral judgement. When a 
person accepts that his own earlier moral opinions have been improved, how does he 
explain the faultiness of his earlier judgement? The factors we converge on giving in such 
explanations at least include the five just identified. Secondly, the account of good moral 
judgement which they suggest corresponds to our account of good judgement concerning 
other, non-moral, subjects.10 To characterize a good judge of perceptual, aesthetic, 
economic, or other matters, we should give a list that follows the same pattern. In each 
case, a good judge must be someone who gives full attention to all the features relevant to 
the kind of assessment in question. But in no case does this suffice for good judgement. 
The relevant features must be attended to in the right way, and assigned the right relative 
importance. And failures to do this will correspond to the other failures we identified in 
the moral case. Inferential error or inconsistency will vitiate judgement in any of these 
domains. Inexperience will in each case count against my judgement, if it is the source of 
my disagreement with faultless judges. And corresponding to impartiality and sympathy, 
there is in each other domain a pair of analogous characteristics, one pertaining to the 
absence of bias, and the other to a distinctive form of interest or engagement appropriate 
to the subject matter. In the case of perceptual judgement, these are the normal 
functioning of one’s sense-organs and normal external conditions; in the aesthetic case, 
they can plausibly be styled freedom from prejudice and “delicacy of imagination”;11 in 
the economic case (or, for that matter, in the predictive application of any science), we 
 
10  As Mark Nelson reminds me, Rawls makes this point in supporting his similar list of characteristics of 
“competent moral judges”: John Rawls, “Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics,” Philosophical Review 
60 (1951), pp.180-81. 
11  David Hume, “Of the Standard of Taste,” in Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary, T.H. Green and T.H. 
Grose (eds.) (London: Longmans, 1907), pp.266-84, at p.272. 
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can cite a freedom from vested interest and a concern with understanding the relevant 
features of the case in the light of the best explanatory theory. 
 Why should continuity with judgement of other kinds count in favour of an account of 
good moral judgement? Because of the plausibility of characterizing moral judgements as 
objective, at least in the limited sense that when a person judges that a given object is M, 
she is committed to thinking two things: that it is M independently of her thinking so; and 
that anyone who thinks it is not M is mistaken. Just what kind of metaphysical view is 
required to vindicate moral objectivity is of course controversial. However, provided only 
that moral judgement does in fact have this objective character, the concern to avoid 
distortions of judgement will be central to our conception of good judgement. This 
concern is shared by the other domains in which we speak of good judgement, and 
explains why we should expect to find an appropriately corresponding structure to the 
account of good judgement in each domain. 
 
V:  THE REGRESS-PROBLEM 
There are defensible claims to be made about the distinguishing characteristics of good 
moral judges. I have offered an initial list of five such features, but only to emphasize the 
general point that there are two plausible sources of support for an account of this sort. 
Now let us return to our problem. How can the virtue-ethicist use this to do any 
epistemological work? At first, the dilemma of Section III seems still to be firmly in 
place. On the first horn, the claim 
All and only people who base their judgement on full, sympathetic and impartial 
attention to all and only the morally relevant features of a given object, who commit 
no inferential errors or inconsistencies, and who cannot be faulted for inexperience, 
are good judges of the moral character of that object 
seems false, for precisely the reason foreshadowed in Section III: the list of five features 
does not give us a fully determinative rule for good moral judgement. Even if we 
specified which of the many different possible conceptions of sympathy and impartiality a 
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good judge must possess, that still would not guarantee a judge who assigned the right 
relative importance to the various morally relevant features of objects.  Evidently, a good 
moral judge is not simply someone bearing the five characteristics; it is the right kind of 
person bearing them. These characteristics provide at most prima facie rules for 
someone’s being a good moral judge. And the virtue-ethicist’s earlier argument gives us 
reason to be sceptical about whether there is any further, fully determinative rule 
specifying the conditions under which someone is a good moral judge. To see when 
someone with this list of characteristics — or any further, improved list — counts as a 
good moral judge, I need — not an independent rule to apply, but — good moral 
judgement. And this impales us, it seems, back on the second horn of the dilemma: the 
regress-problem. 
 However, this problem can now be answered. To be warranted in holding a given 
moral opinion, I do not need a warrant for a complete set of premises entailing the 
conclusion that good moral judges would arrive at that opinion. All I need is an 
undefeated prima facie case for this conclusion. That will give me undefeated reasons for 
thinking what I do, and that is what warrant for judgement amounts to. A set of prima 
facie rules for good moral judges will supply me with such a case, provided it is 
reasonable for me to believe two things: first, that others’ disagreement with me is 
explained by their being flawed in the respects mentioned in those rules, and secondly, 
that my own judgement is not so explained. (Without the second condition, the possibility 
would remain open that no-one’s judgement is warranted.) 
 The regress-problem looked at first like an a priori demonstration of the impossibility 
of ever warranting a moral opinion on the virtue-ethicist’s view. We have found that it is 
not this. What it does still suggest, however, is that a moral opinion of mine will be 
unwarranted unless I can satisfy the two conditions just given. If I cannot explain my 
opponents’ disagreement with me in terms of the listed characteristics of good judgement, 
it still remains possible that their judgement is inferior to mine; but I cannot (according to 
the virtue-ethicist’s view) be warranted in thinking that it is inferior, because any attempt 
to supply that warrant falls foul of the regress-problem. I could only warrant my claim 
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that I am a superior moral judge if I could warrant the claim that I am a superior judge of 
moral judges. 
 But given the extent and depth of actual moral disagreement, this may still seem to 
lead to moral scepticism. In particular, many moral disagreements about the moral value 
of an action themselves rest on disagreements about the moral relevance of features of the 
action. Agents whom I am inclined to fault for their lack of sympathy or impartiality often 
have a different conception of the kind of sympathy or impartiality that is morally 
appropriate. If my resources for faulting the judgement of people who disagree with me 
stop at the five simple features mentioned above, it seems they do not extend very far. 
And if faulting their judgement is required in order for my own to be warranted, then that 
seems to leave me with practically nothing that I am warranted in holding. There may not 
be an a priori argument for the impossibility of warranted moral judgement; but it may 
seem that it is hardly ever actually achieved. 
 
VI:  AVOIDING SCEPTICISM 
The virtue-ethicist’s view avoids this bleak conclusion. There are four general grounds for 
thinking this, the last being the most far-reaching. 
 First and most obviously, many of the most stubborn moral disagreements are based 
on background empirical or metaphysical disagreement. Here, the case just sketched for 
scepticism fails, since faulting my opponents does not require faulting their moral 
judgement. I may accept, for instance, that a religious fundamentalist with whom I 
disagree is a morally sensitive person, bearing all the characteristics of a good moral 
judge, without thereby having to withdraw my own opposing moral opinion. I should only 
do that if I come to doubt my warrant for holding the different religious beliefs I do. 
 The second point is that standards of warrant are not standards of proof. To be 
warranted in holding my opinion in the face of others’ disagreement, I must be able 
reasonably to attribute their disagreement to a flaw in their moral judgement; but that does 
not mean being able to demonstrate that anyone who does not see this is confused. After 
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all, I can be warranted in believing something while others are warranted in taking the 
opposite view. Thus, if, in my experience, people who think and act like you tend to be, 
say, self-favouring, then that is a reason for me to doubt your judgement. This is evidence 
that you are flawed in respect of one of the features of good judges — evidence which 
falls well short of proof, but which may still make this the most reasonable thing for me 
to believe. 
 Thirdly, and less obviously, I can ask to what extent my opponents take account of my 
disagreement with them. Grounds for thinking they are failing to do this are themselves 
grounds for faulting their judgement. Why? On the virtue-ethical view, your opinion is 
warranted to the extent that you are warranted in faulting the judgement of those who 
disagree with you, and not faulting your own. Others’ disagreement gives you a reason to 
doubt your own judgement, unless you can fault theirs. But if so, then someone who does 
not take into account others’ disagreement is overlooking a morally relevant feature of the 
object being judged — namely, its being the object of a contrary opinion in someone 
whose judgement she cannot fault. And if she is overlooking a morally relevant feature, 
her judgement is flawed. 
 But even if I cannot fault my opponents’ judgement on any of these grounds, it still 
does not follow that I am unwarranted in judging as I do. For a further simple point 
should be made — one with a clear analogue in the case of empirical judgement. If I 
cannot fault someone else’s contrary judgement concerning a subject on which both of us 
cannot be correct, that gives me a reason to re-examine my own. But if, upon appropriate 
re-examination, I reasonably fail to find anything wrong with my own judgement, then 
surely I am warranted in thinking what I do. If it still seems to me that p, and there is no 
feature of my judgement that should lead me to doubt it, then I am warranted in believing 
that p. Does this mean abandoning the virtue-ethical test for warranted judgement, and 
allowing that I can be warranted even when I cannot fault the judgement of those who 
disagree? No. For the warrant I have for my own judgement itself gives me a case for 
faulting theirs. If an action strikes me as wrong, and upon appropriately re-examining my 
judgement it is reasonable for me to find no fault with it, then that is itself a reason — 
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clearly, a defeasible one, but in these circumstances the best I have — to think that it is 
my judgement that is right, and therefore that my opponents’ is flawed. 
 For these four reasons, then, it is a mistake to think that the virtue-ethical view set out 
above is a recipe for moral scepticism. However, the position that has emerged needs, 
finally, to be defended against the contrary worry: that warrant is too easy to come by, not 
too difficult. Surely, it is often the case that neither party to a moral disagreement can 
initially fault the other in terms of our simple list of features of good judgement. If, 
whenever this happens, a second look at your own judgement suffices to warrant it, then it 
may seem that there is too little that will actually count as unwarranted moral opinion. 
 To respond to this, let us return to two questions raised earlier: the question of the 
basis for warranting judgements about morally relevant features, and the question of the 
relationship between “virtue ethics” as conceived here, and ethical theory. 
 
VII:  MORALLY RELEVANT FEATURES AND THEORY 
Mentioning full attention to all and only morally relevant features of the object of 
judgement seemed indispensable to our list of characteristics of good moral judges. 
However, the obvious question it invites concerns how claims concerning moral 
relevance are themselves to be warranted. For moral disagreements can be disagreements 
about whether a feature is morally relevant. And, very commonly, they are disagreements 
about how much relevance a feature has, and its importance relative to other morally 
relevant features. How do I warrant the thought that I am the one making the correct 
judgements of moral relevance? 
 Now one way of answering this has just been given. If it seems to me that a given 
feature has a certain moral relevance, and if I reasonably fail to find fault with my 
judgement upon appropriately re-examining it in the light of others’ disagreement, then 
that warrants me in holding the opinion I do, and in faulting my opponents’ judgement. 
This, as we just saw, provokes a worry that it is too permissive, leaving us with too little 
unwarranted moral opinion. 
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 A less permissive answer would be available, however, to someone who produced a 
plausible ethical theory. Such a theory would say which features are morally relevant, 
what makes them relevant, and the relations they bear to each other, as parts of a unified 
and systematic moral outlook. If unity and systematicity enhance the credibility of a 
person’s judgements,12 then my warrant for the moral opinions I hold will be strengthened 
to the extent that I can integrate them into a theory of this kind. And I would be entitled to 
claim a stronger warrant for my opinions than my opponents’, if they lacked that 
theoretical support; so the permissive conclusion would be resisted. 
 What of the argument against ethical theory in Section II, though, accusing it of a 
faulty conception of the relation of rules to moral justification? The reply turns out to be 
simple. Most ethical theorists can readily disavow the aim of producing the kind of fully 
determinative rules targeted by that argument. They can deny that this is the status of the 
fundamental rules they identify (“Right actions are those maximizing well-being”, “An 
act is wrong if its performance under the circumstances would be disallowed by any 
system of rules for the general regulation of behaviour which no-one could reasonably 
reject as a basis for informed, unforced, general agreement”,13 and so on), and can 
embrace the idea that good judgement is needed for their correct application. This leaves 
plenty of room for relations of systematicity and unity to hold between the judgements 
 
12  One kind of anti-theoretical view denies this: it draws attention to the fact that features of moral 
relevance are not only reasons for judgement; they are also, and are primarily, reasons for action; and 
reasons for action (it holds) are not subject to the canons of systematicity and unity by which theory-
construction is governed. I discuss this view in “Practical Theory,” in Cullity and Gaut (eds), Ethics and 
Practical Reason (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997). 
13  T.M. Scanlon, “Contractualism and Utilitarianism,” in A. Sen and B. Williams (eds), Utilitarianism and 
Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p.110. 
- 21 - 
theorized in relation to these fundamental rules, yielding the epistemological conclusions 
just set out.14 
 It makes sense, then, to look for an ethical theory and, if I succeed, to claim a warrant 
for my opinions that my opponents’ do not possess. But there is no guarantee that there is 
any such theory to be found. For while the virtue-ethicist’s argument fails to undermine 
the search for an ethical theory, it does still show that such a theory is not required for 
warranted moral judgement. Section II did undermine the thought that we need a theory 
codifying independent rules which are necessary for moral justification. And Sections III-
VI have shown that a satisfactory account of the warrant moral judgements can possess 
will be available even if the search for a theory fails. Without a moral theory, we do seem 
to have a more permissive view about warrant.15 But it is not clear what should be 
thought objectionable about the permissive view. All it deprives me of is the ability to say 
that those who disagree with me are unwarranted in doing so. It does not deprive me of a 
warrant for thinking that those who disagree with me are incorrect; and it is only this that 
I require if I am to warrant my own opinions. 
 As developed here, then, the virtue-ethicist’s argument leads us to the conclusion that 
an anti-theoretical but non-sceptical position remains a possibility. What must be 
abandoned, though, is the original suggestion that this is the only possibility: perhaps the 
search for an ethical theory will succeed. What is at stake, I have argued, is the 
permissiveness of the resulting moral epistemology. My success in finding a theory would 
deprive me of a warrant for judgements that would otherwise be warranted. 
 
14  For defences of ethical theory in this spirit, compare T.M. Scanlon, “The Aims and Authority of Moral 
Theory,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 12 (1992), Sect.III; Samuel Scheffler, Human Morality (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1992), Ch.3.  
15  Just how permissive a view is generated is a further large question that will have to remain unsettled 
here. It depends on how often it really will be reasonable to find my own moral judgement to be faultless.  
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 The first of the conclusions announced in Section I has been drawn: the virtue-ethical 
attack on ethical theory fails. And the second should also now be evident. There is no 
sense in which the theorizing consistent with virtue-ethics will supply us with a 
distinctive “virtue theory”: the theories I have been discussing are simply the familiar 
candidates. Virtue-ethics neither undermines nor produces ethical theory. What it has 
given us, however, is a strong framework for moral epistemology, which makes an anti-
theoretical but non-sceptical position a clear possibility — the one we are left with if our 
attempts at theory-construction fail. 
